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EXPLORING THE POLITICAL SIDE OF BOARD INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGY:  A
STUDY OF MIXED-OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS
Abstract
Our article reports findings  from  a  comparative  study  of  strategic  decision-making  and  board
functioning in nine firms. Findings  from  our  study  indicate  that  the  heterogeneity  of  interests
represented in the board, members’ possession of relevant knowledge, and the presence of ex-ante
conflict resolution mechanisms combine in shaping if and how board members engage in strategy-
related   activities   and   how   strategic   decisions   are   taken.   Our   findings    extend    current
understandings about  the  strategic  functions  of  the  board  (monitoring,  advice,  and  resource-
dependence), suggesting how, under  certain  conditions,  boards  may  act  as  negotiation  forums
where directors search for a reconciliation between diverging shareholders’ interests and views.
Keywords: boards of directors, board involvement in strategy, interests, politics, strategic
decisions
INTRODUCTION
Research on board involvement in strategy can  be  largely  traced  back  to  two  main  theoretical
approaches, namely a strategic choice perspective  and  an  agency  perspective  (Rindova,  1999).
While the former focused on the capacity of board members to contribute to the development  and
refinement of strategic decisions  (e.g.  Carpenter  and  Westphal,  2001;  Tashakori  and  Boulton,
1983),  the  latter  examined  how  boards  could  prevent  managers  from   developing   corporate
strategies that privileged their own interests at the  expense  of  the  shareholders’  (e.g.  Baysinger
and Hoskisson, 1990; Boeker and Goodstein, 1993).
Collectively, these studies have considerably advanced our understanding of how and  why
boards of directors engage in  strategy-related  activities.  Critical  reviews  of  research  on  board
involvement in strategy, however, have raised concerns about the tendency  of  extant  research  to
oversimplify the structure of decision making in boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and
Pettigrew,  1999)  and  about  its  limited  capacity  to  capture  the   nuances   of   political   issues
surrounding strategic decisions (Pettigrew, 1992), and they have called for further explorations  of
the context and the  process  of  board  involvement  in  strategy  (McNulty  and  Pettigrew,  1999;
Rindova, 1999).
Following this call, in this article, we report findings from  a  comparative  study  of  board
functioning and strategic decision making in nine  boards  of  mixed-ownership  institutions  –  i.e.
companies where two or more stockholders own large shares of  the  capital  –  a  research  setting
selected  with  the  explicit  aim  of  increasing  the  visibility  of  social   and   political   dynamics
surrounding  strategic  issues.  Evidence  from  our  study  suggests  that   variables   of   cognitive
(members’ possession of relevant knowledge) and political  nature  (heterogeneity  of  represented
interests, presence of ex-ante conflict resolution mechanisms) combined in explaining if  and  how
board members engaged in strategy making  and  how  strategic  decisions  were  taken.  Different
configurations of board involvement seemed  to  arise  in  response  to  different  combinations  of
these variables.
Our findings highlight the influence of the represented interests  on  board  involvement  in
strategy and explore the conditions under which this occurs. In doing  so,  they  provide  empirical
support to the theoretical arguments in favor of the adoption of a political perspective to the  study
of board involvement in strategy, in addition  to  the  more  popular  lines  of  inquiry  inspired  by
theories  of  agency  or  strategic  choice.  In  doing  so,  our  findings  suggest  an  enrichment   of
traditional understandings of the strategic functions of the board as a monitoring device,  a  source
of strategic advice, and a nexus of environmental linkages for securing critical resources (Johnson,
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles  and  Taylor,  2001;  Zahra  and  Pearce,  1989).  In  this  respect,
evidence from our study suggests that in presence of highly diverging interests represented  in  the
board  and  in  absence  of  ex-ante  conflict  resolution  mechanisms,  boards  may   have   also   a
consensus-building function, acting as a negotiation forum where a compromise between  a  set  of
diverging interests is searched for.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The strategic choice perspective
Early research  on  board  involvement  in  strategy  focused  on  insider  representation  –  i.e.  the
percentage of board members who are current or former employees of the firm –  as  a  significant
antecedent of board involvement  in  planning  (Tashakori  and  Boulton,  1983),  decision-making
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992) and strategic change (Goodstein and  Boeker,  1991).  Studies  in  this
tradition followed what Judge and Zeithaml (1992) called a  strategic  choice  perspective,  in  that
they  rested  on  the  idea  that  directors  contribute  to  refine  corporate  strategy   by   evaluating
corporate plans and challenging managers, and by occasionally  engaging  in  the  development  of
strategic alternatives (Andrews, 1980; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Rindova,  1999).  Later  studies
relied  on  simplified  representations  of  the  process  –  such  as  Judge  and   Zeithaml’s   (1992)
distinction between a formation and an evaluation phase – to facilitate survey-based  investigation
of  antecedents  of  board  involvement  (e.g.   Carpenter   and   Westphal,   2001;   Westphal   and
Fredrickson, 2001).
Recent qualitative research on board dynamics, however, indicates multiple ways in which
board members may attempt to  influence  strategic  decisions.  McNulty  and  Pettigrew’s  (1999)
exploration of the role of outside directors brought to  the  identification  of  three  broad  types  of
involvement, as outside directors may “take strategic decisions” (as they  accept  or  reject  capital
investments), “shape strategic decision” (as they try to influence the preparation of the  proposals)
or even “shape the content, context and conduct of  strategy”  (as  their  influence  spans  from  the
formation  to  the  implementation  of  strategies).  Later,  Stiles’  (2001)  field  study  produced   a
sophisticated  account  of  various  activities  through  which  board  members  influence   strategy
making, from business definition (as they set the vision and  the  mission  of  the  organization)  to
gatekeeping (as they screen top management’s proposals and they ensure the respect of the current
strategic framework) and others. Collectively, these findings seem to challenge  the  capacity  of  a
two-step representation of the process such as Judge and Zeithaml’s  (1992)  to  properly  describe
how board members engage in strategy-related activities, and indicate that research on antecedents
of boards involvement in  strategy  may  benefit  from  more  nuanced  and  empirically  grounded
accounts of the process.
The agency perspective
A second line of inquiry has focused on the content of corporate strategies as a  good  indicator  of
the relative influence of outside directors – as representatives of shareholders – on the outcome  of
decisions, investigating how board composition and structure are  related  to  R&D  spending  and
innovation (Hill and Snell, 1988),  diversification  (Hill  and  Snell,  1988;  Yoshikawa  and  Phan,
2005),   strategic    change    (Golden    and    Zajac,    2001;    Goodstein    and    Boeker,    1991),
internationalization (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 2003) and the adoption of  governance
practices (e.g. Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000).
These  studies  largely  adopted  an  agency   perspective,   emphasizing   the   fundamental
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers  over  the  content  of  strategic  decisions
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists (Fama and  Jensen,  1983)  consider  the  board  of
directors  a  primary  mechanism  for  safeguarding   shareholders’   interests   from   opportunistic
behavior of executives. Research in this tradition assumed that proper managerial  incentives  (e.g.
Hill and Snell, 1988; Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt,  1993)  or  a  powerful  board  (e.g.  Baysinger,
Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Westphal, 1998) would eventually induce managers to select strategies  in
the primary interests of shareholders.
Building on a  theoretical  agency  framework,  scholars  inferred  conclusions  on  boards’
behavior  from  the  analysis  of  demographic  characteristics  of  board  members,  assuming  that
demographic factors could capture their inclination towards strategy in an  effective  way  (Golden
and Zajac, 2001). Past studies, however, seem to have  produced  mixed  results,  as,  for  instance,
inside  directors  were  described  alternatively  as  defenders  of  the  existing   course   of   action
1988) or bold supporters of innovation (Baysinger et al., 1991). Furthermore, while  these  studies
generally assumed homogenous preferences among shareholders, recent research  has  highlighted
how different type of owners (owner-managers, investment funds, pension funds, etc.) may  differ
in time horizons and goals, hence in their attitude towards corporate innovation  (Hoskisson,  Hitt,
Johnson    and    Grossman,    2002),    diversification    (Yoshikawa    and     Phan,     2005)     and
internationalization (Tihanyi et al., 2003). These results  indicate  that  closer  examination  of  the
interests represented in the boards may further improve our understanding of the  institutional  and
ownership context  that  affect  the  role  of  the  board  and  its  functioning  (Lubatkin,  Lane  and
Schulze, 2001).
Exploring a complementary theoretical framework
Shortcomings of past studies on board involvement in strategy seem to reflect more general issues
affecting research on board of directors. Reviews of extant research in the major  areas  of  inquiry
have revealed little consistency in past results (Dalton et al., 1998;  Johnson  et  al.,  1996).  While
some scholars have called for more refined correlational research that placed more attention to the
influence of  less  studied,  potentially  moderating  variables  (Dalton  et  al.,  1998),  others  have
observed how search for parsimony and simplicity might have led researchers to oversimplify  the
causal chain linking governance structures and dynamics to corporate  performance,  reducing  the
ability of the research method to detect the  influence  of  variables  not  considered  in  the  design
phase (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992), and  leading  to  overlook  the  complexity  of
processes embedded in a web of multiple and diverging  interests  (Stiles  and  Taylor,  2001).  As
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999: 52) observed, there seems to be a “need to get closer to boards  and
directors to collect primary data about processes of contribution, power and influence”.
While it would be incorrect to claim that research  on  board  involvement  in  strategy  has
totally overlooked issues of power and interests, with few  exceptions  (Hill,  1995;  McNulty  and
Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Stiles, 2001), most researchers have largely relied
on the simplified assumptions of the agency framework  and  have  rarely  investigated  the  actual
interests shaping the interaction between board  members  and  managers.  Yet,  the  idea  that  the
process and outcome of strategic decisions are partly shaped by the specific interests is  central  to
one of the main research traditions on decision-making – i.e.  a  political  perspective  on  strategy
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992).
This school of thought highlights the fact that, in organizations, coalitions  of  people  may
have competing  interests  as  regards  the  outcome  of  strategic  decisions  (Pettigrew,  1973  and
1977). In this respect, strategic decisions are not just about finding rational  solutions  to  technical
or economic problems: insofar as they imply a distribution of resources, they  tend  to  be  affected
by political processes where actors with  partially  diverging  interests  attempt  to  influence  their
outcome (Allison, 1971; Hickson et al., 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik,  1974).  Strategy  formulation,
then, can be considered as a partly boundedly rational and partly political process (Hickson et  al.,
1986). The various interests involved affect strategic decisions  insofar  as  they  find  a  formal  or
informal way – such as representation in the board – to exert influence on the process.
Past research on decision making has investigated the conditions that affect  the  likelihood
that organizational units engage in power struggles over the allocation of resource  (e.g.  Hills  and
Mahoney, 1978), as well as the determinants of the relative power of each subunit (e.g Pfeffer and
Moore, 1980; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974). While later studies observed how an excess of  political
behavior – i.e. focus on personal interests and use  of  power  –  may  reduce  the  effectiveness  of
decision making, to the extent that it may divert attention from organizational goals and  from  the
feasibility of the  adopted  solutions  given  the  environmental  constraints  (Dean  and  Sharfman,
1996), and it may fail to  gather  the  support  required  for  effective  implementation  (Floyd  and
Woolridge, 1992;  Nutt,  1987),  research  in  this  tradition  converges  on  the  idea  that  political
behavior is an intrinsic feature of organizational decision-making (Crozier and Friedberg, 1995).
A political approach to strategy, then, questions the validity of analyses based on universal
assumptions, and emphasizes how the outcome of strategic decisions depend on  a  broad  context,
of which the internal political system is a fundamental  component  (Pettigrew,  1977).  Therefore,
understanding the process and the outcome of strategic decisions requires a careful analysis of  the
set of interests that have the power to influence the focal decision  (Crozier  and  Friedberg,  1977;
Hickson, 1987). In this  view,  studies  of  board  involvement  in  strategy  would  benefit  from  a
preliminary  analysis  of  the  set  of  interests  that  are  represented  in   the   board,   and   of   the
relationships of cooperation and competition that connect the various shareholders.
RESEARCH METHOD
In order to benefit from both the richness and realism of  longitudinal,  grounded  studies  and  the
robustness of  a  comparative  approach,  our  study  relied  on  multiple-case  design  (Yin,  1984;
Eisenhardt, 1989a) and adopted a “synthetic strategy” to  the  analysis  of  process  data  (Langley,
1999). In other  words,  we  compared  evidence  across  several  cases,  searching  for  discernible
patterns and for plausible antecedents of the observed differences, trying to  discriminate  between
local contingencies  and  more  general  regularities  (Eisenhardt,  1989a;  Crozier  and  Friedberg,
1995).
Research setting
Our study was conducted on nine large firms. The selection of cases relied on theoretical sampling
(Miles  and  Huberman,  1994).  We  focused  on  what  we  could  refer  to  as  “mixed-ownership
institutions” – i.e. firms whose ownership  is  distributed  between  a  few  actors,  none  of  whom
controls the majority of the votes, and at least some of whom  have  other  exchange  relationships
with the organization (being a supplier, a customer, a manager, a  competitor,  etc.)  and  therefore
are likely to have multiple interests in the firm’s  conduct  rather  than  mere  profit-maximization.
Our assumption was that the inherent complexity in the ownership configuration of these types  of
firms would have made political processes more visible and therefore easier  to  study  (Pettigrew,
1990).
Combining  various  public  sources,  we  compiled  a  list  of  the  500  largest   industrial,
commercial and service companies in the country, ranked by sales. For 492 of them, we  managed
to gather detailed qualitative and  quantitative  information  about  the  ownership  structure.  Data
came from various sources including the Stock Exchange, the local Chambers  of  Commerce,  the
financial  press,  and  the  companies’   websites.   The   ownership   structure   of   fifty   of   them
corresponded to our theoretical  requirements  (not  fragmented,  but  neither  concentrated  in  the
hands of a single majority owner). Thirty-four of these companies were excluded a priori  because
family ties or other personal bonds among  shareholders  increased  the  likelihood  that  business-
related processes might be blurred by overlapping social dynamics related  to  kinship,  friendship,
obligation, tradition, etc. The remaining sixteen companies were contacted and nine out of  sixteen
agreed to participate to our research (see details in Table I).
-------------------------------
Insert Table I about here
-------------------------------
Data collection
Following a recent call to investigate “both the content and the process  of  board  involvement  in
strategy” (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999, p. 51), our  study  followed  an  embedded  design  (Yin,
1984). First, an analysis of shareholders’ interests and of  the  multiple  relationships  between  the
former and the company provided the contextual information required to properly  understand  the
observed processes. Next,  we  examined  board  activities  in  order  to  understand  what  type  of
strategic issues where brought to the attention of the  board.  Finally,  in  order  to  understand  the
processual side of board involvement, we investigated instances of strategic  decisions:  how  they
started, how they unfolded and how a final agreement was reached.
Following prescriptions for case-based research (Yin, 1984), company data were  collected
from different sources: archival research in the business press  and  other  secondary  sources,  and
semi-structured interviews with members of the board.
Archival  research:  preliminary  archival   research   in   business   magazines   and   other
secondary sources (websites, corporate  directories,  annual  reports  and  other  publicly  available
corporate documents, etc.) helped us  draw  a  company  profile  and  trace  the  company’s  recent
history. As customary in inductive  research  (Locke,  2001),  data  collection  followed  emerging
insights. After preliminary analysis indicated a possible influence of shareholders’ agreements  on
board members’ involvement in strategy, we also collected copies of the  company  by-laws  from
the  local  Chambers  of  Commerce  in  order  to  gather   more   precise   information   about   the
institutional context of decisions. As insights from  the  cases  indicated  that  the  knowledge  and
expertise of board members could contribute to explain board behavior, further  search  helped  us
identify the professional  background  of  most  board  members  or  their  position  in  the  mother
companies.  Then,  following  previous  research   (Baysinger   and   Zardkoohi,   1986;   Hillman,
Cannella and Paetzold, 2000),  board  members  were  tentatively  categorized  according  to  their
presumed strategic role as insiders  (i.e.  current  officers  of  the  firm),  decision  controllers  (i.e.
shareholders’ representatives, whose primary role was  to  ensure  that  decisions  safeguarded  the
interest of the former), business experts (former executives or current officers in other firms in the
same  or  related  industries)  and  support  specialists  (lawyers,  bankers,   accountants   or   other
professionals, occasionally providing specialized expertise on specific issues), or a combination of
the above. Archival data were triangulated  with  information  collected  in  the  interviews,  which
increased our confidence in the reliability of our assessment.
Semi-structured   interviews.   Archival   research   helped    us    prepare    semi-structured
interviews, aimed at collecting detailed information on boards’ involvement in strategic decisions.
For each company, we interviewed at least two members of the board (see Table II). The selection
of our informants was aimed at collecting data from directors which (a) were in a good position to
be informed about  board  behavior  and  involvement  in  strategy,  and  (b)  represented  different
shareholders – in order to capture different views on board-related issues  and  reduce  the  risk  of
collecting a biased representation of board dynamics (Friedberg, 1993).
Typically interviews lasted between one  and  a  half  and  two  hours.  In  order  to  ensure
reliability, both researchers were present at all the interviews. Given the content  of  interviews,  at
times we were not allowed to use a tape  recorder.  However,  detailed  notes  were  collected  and,
soon after each interview, they  were  compared,  merged  and  transcribed.  Following  Miles  and
Huberman’s (1994) suggestion,  transcriptions  were  supplemented  by  contact  summary  sheets,
reporting essential data, key issues arising from the  interviews,  as  well  as  insightful  quotations
that could help future theorizing.
We initially asked our informants about their company, their industry and their strategy. In
a second part of the interview, we asked them to illustrate the ownership  structure,  and,  in  order
obtain  a  clearer   representation   of   each   shareholder’s   interests   in   corporate   activity   and
performance, we asked them to indicate if shareholders had other relationships with  the  company
besides shareholdings (see Table I). In the third part of  the  interview,  we  focused  on  boards  of
directors: their  structure,  composition  and  functioning.  We  asked  our  informants  to  describe
typical activities during board meetings. In order to obtain  a  comparable  representation  of  what
each board really did, we asked our informants to rank board activities according to  their  relative
prevalence inside and outside board meetings.
The fourth  part  of  the  interview  investigated  strategic  decisions.  Following  a  method
already used in research on decision making (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989b), for each firm we  asked  our
informants to identify a recent major decision that had involved the board and could be considered
representative of the usual process by which strategic decisions are made (see Table II). We asked
our informants to trace the story of the decision,  trying  to  distinguish  facts  and  events  (how  it
started, who was involved, etc.) from personal observations.
-------------------------------
insert Table II about here
-------------------------------
Data Analysis
Data analysis  combined  common  methods  for  grounded-theory  building  (Glaser  and  Strauss,
1967;  Locke,  2001)  and  comparative  case  analysis  (Eisenhardt,   1989a).   Accordingly,   data
collection and analysis proceeded in an iterative way, as new data were gathered  in  order  to  test
the robustness of emerging interpretations about possible  explanations  of  board  involvement  in
strategy.
In an early stage of our analysis, we carefully  examined  our  informants’  descriptions  of
board  activity  and  strategic  decisions,  aiming  at  producing  a   rich   representation   of   board
involvement  in  strategy.  First,  following  prescriptions  for  grounded-theory  building   (Locke,
2001), board  members’  descriptions  of  board  activities  were  content  analyzed,  searching  for
common categories across cases. First-order categories were labeled in terms that were as close as
possible to the words actually used by our informants. In a second round of  categorization,  cross-
case  comparison  helped  us   group   first-order   categories   in   second-order   macro-categories
illustrating the prevailing activities of each board.
As regards prevailing board activities, a comparison of the rankings produced by members
of the same board showed consistent agreement, at least as regards the first three positions.  These
results reinforced our confidence in the reliability of an assessment of  the  prevalent  activities  of
the boards based on the upper part of the ranks – i.e. on the top three activities  mentioned  by  our
informants. Further cross-case comparison revealed two prevailing configurations, which building
on Stiles (2001) we labeled as “setting the strategic context” vs.  “gatekeeping”,  emphasizing  the
prevailing  strategic  activities  performed  by  the  board  (see  Tables  III,  IV  and  V  later).  The
different relative importance of strategy-related activities defined what we could  call  the  type  of
board involvement in strategy.
Next, following past research on strategic decisions  (Eisenhardt,  1989b),  we  merged  the
descriptions of  strategic  decisions  into  “decision  stories”  based  on  our  informants’  accounts.
Combining  multiple  perspectives  helped  us  move  beyond  individual   perceptual   biases   and
alleviated  potential  recall  problems.  Analysis  of  decision  stories  helped   us   investigate   the
participation of board members in the various phases of the decision process. While  past  research
has generally distinguished between a formation phase  and  an  evaluation  phase  (Carpenter  and
Westphal, 2001;  Judge  and  Zeithaml,  1992),  our  data  suggested  the  adoption  of  a  four-step
framework  (generation  of  ideas,  selection  of  a  course  of  action,  execution,  and  control)   to
categorize the scope of board involvement, understood as the extent of  board  involvement  in  the
various conceptual phases of the process.
Finally, as we analyzed strategic decisions, we observed that boards did not differ  only  in
their prevailing strategic activities and in their involvement in the various  phases  of  the  process,
but also in the way a final agreement was reached. Building on earlier frameworks, Mintzberg and
colleagues (Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorèt, 1976, p. 258)  identified  three  basic  modes  for
choosing  among  alternative  strategic  solutions:  judgment,  analysis  and  bargaining.  Judgment
refers to decisions made by individuals in their own mind, on the basis of a  subjective  evaluation
of  the  consequences.  Analysis,  on  the  contrary,  is  based  on   a   rational   evaluation   of   the
alternatives, supported by factual data and technical tools. Bargaining, finally, produces  decisions
that mediate between the interests of different parties with conflicting goals. Following Mintzberg
and colleagues, we categorized the prevailing mechanism for decision making for  each  case.  Not
surprisingly, given the institutional context in which decisions were taken, no board gave  primacy
to individual judgment: while some relied on rational analysis, in others, decisions  emerged  from
intensive negotiations among the parties involved.
Cross-case comparison of boards and board  members’  involvement  in  strategy  revealed
three different patterns of behavior across cases, characterized by different  combinations  of  type
and scope of board involvement in strategy as  well  as  by  the  prevailing  decision  mechanisms.
Accordingly,  we  formed  three  groups  of  three,  two  and  four  cases   respectively   displaying
different patterns of involvement in strategy, and we tentatively named their boards as  “Type  A”,
“Type B” and “Type C” (see Tables III, IV and V). In  a  further  round  of  comparative  analysis,
combining within-case analysis with cross-case comparison, we searched for variables  that  could
explain differences in the observed patterns across board types. We adopted  a  comparative  logic
closer to the one described by Eisenhardt (1989a), according to which within-case  analysis  based
on rich, often anecdotal, information was used to generate  insights  to  be  developed  further  and
tested  in  cross  case  analysis.  We  constructed  comparative  tables  to   identify   discriminating
variables that could explain similarities and differences in patterns of involvement (summarized in
Figure 1).
Provisional interpretations were developed in an iterative way, as emerging insights  called
for additional data collection and tentative explanations were checked across cases; in this  respect
each case was used  to  confirm  or  disconfirm  inferences  drawn  from  other  cases  (Eisenhardt,
1989a). Following Eisenhardt’s (1989a) indications, we referred to the existing literature to  refine
and enrich inductively derived theoretical insights.
FINDINGS
The analysis of board activities across the nine cases revealed three different patterns of  behavior,
resulting from  different  combinations  of  the  type  and  scope  of  board  involvement  –  i.e.  the
prevailing strategic activities performed by the board  and  the  relative  involvement  of  members
along the various phases of the process – and the prevailing decision mechanism.
-------------------------------
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Some boards, tentatively labeled “Type A”, mainly displayed a  moderate  involvement  in
strategy making – similar to what McNulty  and  Pettigrew  (1999)  described  as  taking  strategic
decisions (see Table III). In Redaelli Tecna, Tecnologistica and Teknecomp, shares  were  roughly
distributed between a  top  management  team,  collectively  owning  up  to  30-40%,  and  various
institutional and private  investors.  In  these  companies,  boards  evaluated  proposals  for  capital
investment and controlled the results of their implementation, but  left  full  responsibility  for  the
generation,  elaboration  and  implementation  of  alternatives  to  managers.   The   evaluation   of
proposals generally relied on the analysis of  the  financial  implications  of  strategic  or  business
plans.
Other  boards,  named  “Type  B”,  displayed  a  higher  involvement  of  members  in   the
development and refinement of strategic plans, as they would often engage in what  McNulty  and
Pettigrew (1999) describe as shaping strategic decisions (see Table IV). In joint  ventures  Nylstar
and Polimeri Europa, outside board members  –  often  functional  or  divisional  managers  in  the
mother companies – would engage, together with top managers, in the  formulation  of  plans  that
would later be submitted to the collective discussion. Directors, either individually or collectively,
raised issues, proposed  alternatives  and  contributed  to  their  elaboration,  and  sometimes  even
followed their implementation. In other words, board members tended to be involved all along the
process. Like  in  Type  A  boards,  however,  the  evaluation  of  alternatives  relied  primarily  on
rational  analysis  of  the  proposals  submitted  to  the  board,  based  on   financial   or   industrial
considerations.
Similarly,  “Type  C”  boards  displayed  a  high  involvement  in  all  the   phases   of   the
decisions,  and  actively  shaped  goals,  policies  and  decisions  (see  Table  V).  Their   behavior,
however, resembled more what McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) described  as  shaping  the  content
and context of strategy. In joint ventures Olivetti Canon Industriale, Telepiù,  Italtel  and  Siemens
Nixdorf Informatica, outside board members – often  ex  executives  or  other  business  experts  –
would vigorously engage in the elaboration, discussion and refinement of broad strategic plans  as
well  as  specific  business  projects.  Discussions  would  be  carried  out   largely   outside   board
meetings, and decisions would be  brought  to  the  board  only  after  the  parties  had  reached  an
agreement.  Unlike  Type  B  boards,  decisions  would  emerge  from  intense  negotiation  among
managers and  board  members,  aimed  at  developing  a  solution  that  would  accommodate  the
interests of the company and its shareholders.
Comparative  analysis  across  cases  helped  us  identify  three   variables   –   namely   the
heterogeneity of interests represented in the board, directors’  possession  of  relevant  knowledge,
and the existence of ex-ante  mechanisms  for  resolving  conflicts  among  shareholders  –  which
seemed to combine  in  explaining  much  of  the  observed  differences  in  board  involvement  in
strategy-related  activities.  The  resulting  explanatory  framework  is  summarized  in   Figure   1,
highlighting the moderating effect of ex-ante conflict regulation on  the  relationship  between  the
configuration of shareholders’ interests and some aspects of  board  involvement  in  strategy,  and
the possible mediating effect of members’ knowledge between  interests  and  the  scope  of  board
involvement; a relationship, however, which, in absence of robust evidence from all  the  cases,  is
tentatively indicated with a dotted line.
 -------------------------------
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The scope of board involvement
By scope of board involvement, we refer to the  extent  to  which  board  members  engage  in  the
various phases of the decision making process. Three of  the  observed  boards  showed  a  narrow
involvement in strategy making, focusing mostly  on  approving  or  rejecting  strategic  proposals
developed by top managers and controlling their realization. The remaining six showed  a  broader
involvement in all the phases of  the  process,  including  the  elaboration  and  implementation  of
alternative courses of action.
In  Redaelli  Tecna,   Teknecomp   and   Tecnologistica,   Type   A   boards   generally   set
quantitative   objectives   (in   terms   of   growth,   profitability,   etc.),   vesting   managers    with
responsibility  for  strategy  formulation  (see  Table  III).  Plans  were   initiated,   developed   and
elaborated almost exclusively by the managers, although directors were kept  constantly  informed
about the emerging alternatives that would later be submitted to  the  attention  of  the  board.  The
case of industrial conglomerate Teknecomp, summarized by the CEO, is illustrative of the  typical
early stages of the process:
The opportunity to sell a subsidiary, a  producer  of  electronic  components,  was  initially
brought to the attention of the board  by  a  manager  of  the  company  itself  (…)  He  had
received an offer from a large American client. (…) After having informed  the  board,  we
[the CEO, the financial manager and the general manager of the subsidiary] worked on  the
project for 6-7 months (…) Having reached an agreement with our counterpart,  we  finally
brought the proposal to the board.
Type A boards focused mainly on approving or rejecting top managers’  strategic  proposals  and  controlling
their execution through a rich information flow. Strategic issues would be discussed and decisions taken during  board
meetings, on  the  basis  of  the  detailed  information  provided  for  by  the  management.  Decisions  would  be  later
implemented by the managers, and their results again brought to the attention of the committee and the board.
In all the other cases – corresponding to the six  joint  ventures  –  the  involvement  of  the
board was broader and the steps were not as well defined:  boards,  either  collectively  or  through
some  of  their  members,  were  often  involved  in  the  generation  and  elaboration  of   strategic
alternatives (see Tables IV and V), as they would often delegate  members  to  assist  managers  in
the analysis of issues and in the formulation of proposals that would be  discussed  during  plenary
meetings.
At producer of artificial fibers Nylstar, for  instance,  in  order  to  thoroughly  analyze  the
implications of the proposed acquisition of a plant in a former Eastern  European  country,  a  joint
committee including board members and directors was formed (see Table IV). As the chairman of
Nylstar explained:
At first sight, the deal seemed attractive, but it was fraught with uncertainties.  In  order  to
increase our understanding of the pros and cons of the operation,  we  decided  to  create  a
committee that  would  include  the  general  manager  and  two  outside  directors,  a  sales
manager  and  an  operations  manager  in  the  mother  companies.  (…)  The  task  of   the
committee was  to  collect  further  information  about  the  opportunity  and  to  develop  a
proposal to the board. Its composition ensured a broad range of expertise,  adequate  to  the
complexity that we perceived in the task.
Rather than simply choosing between different alternatives proposed by the managers, board members would
take an active part in their  development,  so  that  it  was  difficult  to  clearly  distinguish  a  generation  phase  and  a
selection phase. While boards usually took formal responsibility for the selection  of  alternative  proposals,  decisions
were taken to boards’ meeting only after the shareholders’ representatives sitting on  the  committee  had  analyzed  in
depth the pros and cons of the alternatives and actively contributed to shape and refine them. Alternatives  brought  to
the board would then  be  discussed,  sometimes  approved,  sometimes  rejected.  At  times,  however,  outside  board
members would even support managers in the implementation of decisions (see Tables IV and V). 
An early interpretation of our findings led us to hypothesize that  the  observed  differences
could  be  ascribed  primarily  to  the  divergence  among  the  shareholders’   interests   that   were
represented in the board. In fact,  some  of  our  informants  mentioned  explicitly  how  members’
involvement  in  the  early  stages  of  the  process  was  often  inspired  by  specific  plans  of   the
shareholders they represented. Take the  case,  for  instance,  of  Siemens  Nixdorf  Informatica,  a
producer of systems and services for office automation, as described by the chairman of the board:
During a regular board meeting, a  representative  of  one  shareholder  [Siemens  Nixdorf]
proposed  to  spin-off  the  information  service  business.  He  proposed  to  create  a   new
company, which would receive all the assets of  the  venture  in  the  information  services.
The proposal was  clearly  inspired  by  the  decision  of  Siemens  Nixdorf  to  increase  its
presence in that business. The spin-off would have facilitated the realization of this plan  in
our country.
However, while heterogeneous interests seemed to be generally associated with the tendency to  purposefully
attempt to shape the content of decision,  within-case  analysis  did  not  provide  robust  evidence  of  a  direct  causal
connection between the heterogeneity of shareholders’ interests and the scope of board involvement.
In  the  interpretation  of  our  informants,  a  second  variable,  namely  the  possession   of
relevant  knowledge,  seemed  to  display  a  more  robust   and   direct   correlation.   By   relevant
knowledge, we specifically refer to functional or market knowledge that can be usefully applied to
the problem solving process implicit in  most  strategic  decisions  (Hickson  et  al.,  1986)  and  is
therefore  likely  to  enhance  the  capacity  of  board  members  to  perform   their   advisory   task
effectively (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Further examination of the distribution of knowledge and
expertise  among  board  members,  because  of   their   professional   background   or   their   past
experience (see Tables VI and VII), seemed to support this emerging interpretation.
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In Type A boards, most outside directors had been appointed by  institutional  investors  in
order to monitor managers’ decisions and safeguard the interest of their appointers (see Table VI).
In  doing  that,  they  primarily  performed  the  role  of   “decision   controllers”   (Baysinger   and
Zardkoohi, 1986).  They  were  executives  of  merchant  banks  or  chartered  accountants  with  a
background in finance or in law, but  lacking  a  deep  knowledge  of  the  business.  The  CEO  of
Teknecomp generally described the competence of outside directors as “generic”. Some  of  them,
because of their professional background, occasionally acted as “support specialists”  (Hillman,  et
al., 2000) in that they provided specialized advice of financial or legal nature on specific  financial
operations.
The potential contribution to strategy formulation of these directors was  largely  described
by our informants as low. Their involvement was limited  to  reviewing  plans,  probing  for  more
information and stimulating their refinement. They demanded a timely and comprehensive flow of
information in order to be able to control top management’s behavior, even in absence of a  strong
knowledge of the technical and commercial  aspects  of  the  business.  As  a  director  of  Redaelli
Tecna observed:
Every  time  a   proposal   was   advanced,   the   CEO   would   deliver   a   comprehensive
documentation illustrating the project in the details, including  expected  economic  results,
cash flow, etc. (…) He would  guarantee  the  business  assumptions  of  the  plan  (…)  we
reviewed the analysis of the financial aspect of the plan.
In the six joint ventures, instead, most representatives of the partners were functional or divisional  managers
in the mother companies or sometimes ex-managers of the company (see table  VII).  In  other  words,  most  of  them
qualified as “business experts” (Hillman, et al., 2000). While they acted also as decision controllers –  or,
as the chairman  of  Olivetti  Canon  Industriale  defined  them,  as  “observers”  on  behalf  of  the
mother companies – they possessed a profound knowledge of the industrial or commercial side  of
the business that enabled them to play a more substantial role.  At  Siemens  Nixdorf  Informatica,
for instance, the chairman observed repeatedly how involvement in the various phases of  strategy
making was facilitated by the expertise of board members:
Most board members have a deep  knowledge  of  the  company  and  they  give  an  active
contribution to the development of the  strategic  proposals  (...)  Directors  give  ideas  and
contributions: make questions, ask for further analysis, and suggest future  directions.  (…)
It is  normal  [for  board  members]  to  contribute  to  the  elaboration  of  strategies:  some
members even tend to follow strategic issues more closely, outside board meetings. (…)
By virtue of their background, then, most shareholders’ representatives in the six joint ventures were  able  to
bring specific technological, managerial and commercial knowledge to the strategic  process  (see  Tables  IV,  V  and
VII). Frequent interaction and intense collaboration between inside and outside board members  was  common  to  the
six companies. As a director of Italtel, a large producer of telecommunication equipment, explained:
The  fact  that  all  board  members  are  managers  –  in  the  joint  venture,  in  the  mother
companies  or  in  some  affiliated  company  –  ensures  that  they  all   share   a   profound
knowledge of the telecommunication industry. Their contribution to board activities,  then,
is very professional and facilitates collaboration between inside and outside directors.
In summary, our evidence seems to support the following proposition:
Proposition  1:  The  greater  the  amount  of  relevant   knowledge   possessed   by   board
members, the broader the scope of board involvement in strategic decisions.
The type of involvement and the mechanisms of decision
While Type A and B differed in the relative involvement of board members in the  various  phases
of the process, they showed similar patterns of behavior in the prevailing strategic activities of  the
board as a collective unit and in the way strategic decisions were eventually taken.  Both  types  of
boards showed the prevalence of what Stiles (2001) describes as gatekeeping – i.e.  the  evaluation
and screening of strategic proposals advanced by top managers. In  Type  A  and  Type  B  boards,
most meetings would be dedicated to the  analysis  of  financial  results  and  to  the  evaluation  of
capital investments and strategic plans. Although in Type B boards, individual members would be
occasionally involved in refining strategic plans, boards collectively intervened at  the  end  of  the
decision process, discussing and accepting – or rejecting – capital  investment  proposals  formally
advanced by top managers (see Table IV).
Selection largely relied on rational and objective analysis of the alternatives  supported  by
factual data and financial tools. Top managers would usually  submit  plans  in  advance  to  board
members,  along  with  extensive  information.  During  meetings,  directors  would   analyze   and
discuss them with managers. At times, they requested modifications or  even  rejected  the  plan  if
the technical solutions were not convincing or if the financial implications were unsatisfactory.
At Teknecomp and Tecnologistica, for instance, managers  would  illustrate  in  details  the
implications of their proposals. Although their  report  would  often  include  both  qualitative  and
quantitative information, they would place a  particular  emphasis  on  financial  aspects,  as  these
seemed to be the grounds on which proposals would largely be evaluated (see  Table  III).  Similar
patterns of behavior were observed also at Redaelli Tecna, as an outside director recalled:
As usual, we had all received a  detailed  report  a  week  in  advance.  During  the  plenary
meeting, the CEO presented the alternatives, under different levels of projected sales.  (…)
Different  financial  ratios  were  associated  to  each   alternative.   (…)   I   remember   we
discussed for hours. (…) Eventually we  approved  the  investment  that,  compared  to  the
alternative solutions, was expected to  influence  more  positively  future  cash  flows.  (…)
Redaelli is not the usual small business where you hear ‘I have the  impression  that  if  we
enter  that  business…’  We  might  start  with  impressions,  but  eventually  decisions  are
guided by expected cash flows.
Rational analysis seemed to prevail also in Type B boards, such as Nylstar and  Polimeri  Europa,  where  top
managers would submit strategic decisions – developed in collaboration with  some  board  members  –  to  the  board
meeting, where the plan would be discussed  by  all  members  and  approved  or  rejected  after  having  evaluated  its
assumptions and financial implications for the company.
Type C board members, instead, were highly engaged, both individually  and  collectively,
in what Stiles (2001) describes as setting the strategic context for managers’ decisions,  as  boards
clearly defined the overall goals and the boundaries within which strategic plans were expected  to
be formulated. In these companies, shareholders vested the board with  the  responsibility  to  give
managers broad strategic  directions.  In  board  meetings,  much  time  was  spent  discussing  and
defining general policies and competitive issues. In fact, as illustrated in Table V, board  members
did not restrict themselves to set general goals, but would often go down the hierarchy of strategic
decisions, sometimes even having a  word  in  the  development  of  product  policies  and  market
strategies.
Strategic decisions, however, usually emerged from a process  of  bargaining,  in  that  the
selection among the available options  required  mediation  between  possibly  diverging  interests
among  shareholders.  In  Type  C  boards,  when  asked  to  describe  the   decision   process,   our
informants explicitly referred to  the  necessity  to  reach  a  consensus  between  the  shareholders
before a decision was  made  (see  Table  V):  strategic  decisions  were  often  discussed  between
shareholders’ representatives outside  board  meetings,  and  brought  to  a  meeting  only  after  an
agreement was reached.
These boards would perform their functions largely outside plenary  sessions.  At  Telepiù,
for  instance,  an  executive  committee  composed  of  representatives  of  the  three  partners  met
frequently to discuss strategic issues later to be brought to the attention of  the  rest  of  the  board.
However, as an outside  director  appointed  because  of  his  personal  expertise  and  connections
commented, when issues touched the interests of shareholders, decisions  would  in  fact  be  taken
outside the board (see Table V).
The difference in the decision modes used by Type A boards on the one hand and  Type  C
boards on the other  hand  seemed  to  be  explained  primarily  by  the  structure  of  shareholders’
interests  and  in  particular  by  a  variable  we  labeled  heterogeneity   of   represented   interests,
understood as the variety and diversity of the  stakes  represented  in  the  board.  In  the  observed
cases, such heterogeneity derived from the fact that most mother companies were also engaged  in
collaborations of various kinds (i.e. supply of technology or raw  material,  purchase  of  products,
etc.) or were in a position of direct or indirect competition (see Table I). As a member of the board
of digital broadcaster Telepiù observed:
Conflict did not appear in the minutes, but was in the  atmosphere  and  it  was  due  to  the
diverging  interests  among  shareholders.  One  of   them   had   developed   a   proprietary
technology and found itself in a double position, as supplier and client.
When one of the shareholders proposed to upgrade the technological platform of the company, being  also  in
the position of potential supplier, tension arose, as one of the co-CEOs later recalled:
 You see, there was no market price for it, no reference. It was a pure negotiation. Bob [the
other CEO, representing the shareholder-supplier] and I would sit in opposite  offices  with
open doors and could talk to each other without even leaving the office. I  would  also  talk
frequently to Jan [the  chairman,  representing  another  large  shareholder]  and  check  his
reactions (…) and I would go back to Bob and say: Look, if you  do  this,  Jan  will  not  be
happy (…)
Similarly, at Italtel, conflict was heightened because of the respective positions of the mother companies:  on
the one hand, STET was by far the  largest  customer  of  the  venture  and  had  an  interest  in  pushing  development
projects that suited its specific needs, while, on the other hand, Siemens’s products  would  compete  with  Italtel’s  in
some foreign markets. As a director told us:
At times, frictions might arise between the  company  and  its  shareholders  (…)  In  some
European  markets  we  are  actually  competing  with  one  of  the  parent  companies.  For
example in Spain we would like to increase our market share but  the  mother  company  is
trying to stop our plans.
In the specific case we analyzed, parent companies had also opposing views on locating the manufacturing of
a new  product,  as  both  companies  had  interest  in  the  production  being  carried  out  within  their  own  facilities.
Negotiation  between  board  members  was  required  to  find  a  compromise  between   the   diverging   interests   of
shareholders.
In fact, most of our informants mentioned how potential conflicts  of  interests  among  the
shareholders were usually addressed and dealt with outside board meetings, as they often  required
long negotiation among the parts (see Table V). The presence  of  high  officers  from  the  mother
companies, as directors from Italtel and Siemens  Nixdorf  Informatica  explicitly  observed,  gave
boards the possibility to make important decisions that affected  the  interests  of  the  partners.  In
summary:
Proposition 2a: Other things being equal, the  higher  the  heterogeneity  of  shareholders’
interests, the higher  the  likelihood  that  “setting  the  strategic  context”  will  be  the  prevailing
strategic activity of the board, and that bargaining will prevail as a decision mechanism.
 In Type A boards, instead, patterns of conflict were simpler and  closer  to  the  traditional
agency-based representation: managers on one side and pure shareholders (i.e. without contractual
relationship with  the  company)  on  the  other.  Moreover,  managers  also  owned  shares  in  the
company and, hence, just like institutional and private investors of the firm,  they  were  interested
in maximizing the financial return of  the  company.  Our  informants  did  not  mention  particular
conflicts: minor divergence was usually considered easier to solve. As a director at Redaelli Tecna
remarked:
We might have had discussions, but no real problems. (…) Between 1990 and 1996 boards
decisions  had  been  unanimous.  Consensus  was  easy  to  reach  because  interests   were
convergent.  In  1996,  the  board  split  when  the  CEO  and  one  of  the  shareholders,   a
merchant bank, developed opposing views about the decision to go public.
In these cases, the convergence of shareholders’  interests  seemed  to  facilitate  the  adoption  of  procedural
rationality – based on objective evaluation of the alternatives – over political bargaining. As the  CEO  of  Teknecomp
observed (see also Table III):
Only once, in my memory, the board denied approval. We  shared  diverging  views  about
the risk-return profile of an acquisition, and the majority of board members considered  the
acquisition too risky.
Commonality  of  interests  between  investors  made  it  possible  for  a  coalition  of  shareholders   to   veto
managers’ decision, the adequacy of which, then, had to be proven on technical grounds. In formal terms:
Proposition 2b: other things being  equal,  the  lower  the  heterogeneity  of  shareholders’
interests, the higher the likelihood that “gatekeeping” will be the  prevailing  strategic  activity  of
the board, and that rational analysis will prevail as a decision mechanism.
At first, the fact that Type B boards – corresponding to joint ventures Polimeri Europa and Nylstar – shown a
behavior similar to Type A boards, seemed to contradict our tentative interpretation. Yet  further  analysis  revealed  a
substantial difference between the shareholders agreements of the  first  and  the  second  group  of  joint  ventures.  In
these cases, our informants mentioned how venture agreements between  the  partners  regulated  supply  relationships
and other potential conflicts of interest in details. These rules offered a framework  in  the  light  of  which  managers’
proposals could be evaluated. As CEO of Nylstar told us:
Joint venture agreements clearly define contributions and  supply  terms.  They  offer  us  a
precise reference for issues involving a partial conflict of interests. […]
In these ventures, patterns of relationships between shareholders and the  ventures  seemed  to  be  somewhat
simpler and limited to supply relationships.  Hence  it  was  probably  easier  to  circumscribe  potential  conflicts  and
regulate them ex-ante. The presence of what we could call ex-ante  conflict  regulation  mechanisms  –
i.e. formal agreements that regulated in detail the relationships between  the  parties,  reducing  the
strategic discretion of the board,  and  consequently  the  range  of  issues  that  could  possibly  be
disputed and subjected to negotiation – seemed to contribute to the stability of the relationship.  In
fact, one  of  our  informants  at  Polimeri  Europa  reported  how  the  occasional  revision  of  the
shareholders’ agreement opened the way to negotiations aimed at striking a new  balance  between
the conflicting goals of the mother companies. As the CEO observed:
Occasionally, a shareholder may propose changes to the rules governing  the  relationships
between the venture and the mother companies. In these cases, decisions are usually  taken
outside the board, discussed by the shareholders’ representatives and brought to  the  board
only after a consensus is reached.
In Type C boards, instead, shareholders seemed to have left resolution of their diverging  interests  mainly  to
the  negotiations  between  board  members.  In  these  cases,  carefully  designed  governance  structures  ensured  the
“balance”, as one of our informants observed, of the context within which decisions matured. At Telepiù, for instance,
the board was chaired by  a  representative  of  the  Kirch  Group,  while  two  co-CEOs  cohabited  at  the  top  of  the
managerial rank: one was initially appointed by Fininvest, the founding  company,  while  the  second  was  appointed
later by Nethold, a new partner in the venture.  At  Italtel  and  Siemens  Nixdorf  Informatica,  partners  appointed  an
equal amount of directors. The only amendments to the by-laws regarded the rules for electing the  chairman.  In  both
cases, amendments gave one of the partners the right to  propose  a  person  as  chairman,  and  the  other  the  right  to
accept or refuse. Finally, at Olivetti Canon Industriale, ample amendments to the company  by-laws  conferred  to  the
board of directors – where both shareholders were equally represented –  exclusive  authority  over  a  broad  range  of
business decisions, from investing in  research  and  development,  to  the  establishment  or  termination  of  licensing
agreements or any other forms of collaboration between the venture and  other  parties.  Company  by-laws  explicitly
forbade board members from delegating decisions over these issues to smaller committees or the top managers.
In summary the moderating influence of  ex-ante  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  on  the
relationship between the heterogeneity of shareholders’ interest and board involvement in strategy
can be summarized as follows:
Proposition  3.  Other  things  being  equal,  the  presence  of  ex-ante   conflict   resolution
mechanisms will increase the likelihood of “gatekeeping” as the prevailing strategic activity of the
board  and  rational  analysis  as  the   prevailing   decision   mechanisms,   even   in   presence   of
heterogeneous shareholders’ interests.
DISCUSSION
We believe that our findings contribute to increase our understanding  of  board  dynamics  in  that
they (i) substantiate the argument that the adoption  of  a  political  perspective  may  increase  our
understanding of how and under what conditions boards engage in strategy  related  activities  (see
Table VIII), (ii) suggest an expansion of the traditional classification of board functions,  and  (iii)
foreshadow the idea that the salience of the various functions of the board may be contingent upon
contextual factors.
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A political perspective on board involvement in strategy
Past research on board involvement in strategy largely relied on an  agency  or  a  strategic  choice
perspective.   A   third   line   of    inquiry    on    boards    of    directors    adopting    a    resource-
dependence perspective (e.g. Hillman, et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003;  Pfeffer,  1972  and
1973) pointed at the important role of board members in  improving  the  capacity  of  the  firm  to
collect critical resources  from  the  environment,  through  the  co-optation  of  representatives  of
resource-holders or influential members of the  community  (Pfeffer,  1972  and  1973).  Although
this approach seems to have been less popular in recent research on board involvement in strategy,
it is nonetheless important in understanding the strategic functions of the board (see Table VIII).
While some studies have pointed at the  political  nature  of  board  dynamics  (Hill,  1995;
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), applications of  a  political  perspective  to  the  analysis  of  board
involvement in strategy are rare, despite the  fact  that  board  membership  is  a  powerful  way  to
influence resource allocation  processes  in  organizations  (Hickson,  1987).  In  this  respect,  our
findings  indicate  that  if  there  is  a  substantial   convergence   of   goals   and   interests   among
shareholders, the board can be provided  with  a  stable  set  of  goals  and  guidelines  that  can  be
communicated  to  the  managers  and  used  to  evaluate  their   proposals.   However,   increasing
heterogeneity of interests represented in the board is likely to increase  board  members’  concerns
with the political implications of strategic  decisions  even  at  corporate  or  business  level.  As  a
consequence, in presence of high  heterogeneity  of  interests,  boards  will  tend  to  rely  more  on
bargaining than on rational  analysis  or  judgment,  unless  potential  conflict  of  interests  among
shareholders may be regulated ex-ante in company  by-laws  or  other  formal  agreements.  These
conclusions seem to be  applicable  to  any  organizations  where  ownership  structure  and/or  the
company bylaws prevent any single shareholder from exercising total control over  the  board  and
the company. Conversely, even  in  presence  of  high  heterogeneity  of  interests,  the  controlling
shareholder might be able to clearly impose its will (goals and plans) over the  managers,  with  no
need to bargain  –  unless,  of  course,  the  minority  shareholders  could  rely  on  other  forms  of
influence to induce him or her to negotiate.
Our findings are  consistent  with  recent  developments  of  governance  studies  that  have
started to emphasize the importance of formal rules in shaping decision making in the board.  Past
research has generally ignored the influence of rules on board dynamics. Recent studies, however,
has  shown  how  formal  rules  contribute,  for  instance,  to  shape  the  CEO  succession  process
(Ocasio, 1994 and 1999). Ocasio’s  (1999,  p.  386)  studies  acknowledge  the  political  nature  of
board dynamics, as the author suggests that “rules establish the parameters by which  the  political
game is played”. Sociologist of power Ehrard Friedberg observes how rules may be used by actors
engaged in collective action to structure the field of a decision, in order to reduce the autonomy of
participants and the possibility of making use of  their  relative  power  and  discretion  (Friedberg,
1993). Indeed, as we have shown in  our  findings  section,  as  shareholders  preferred  to  leave  a
resolution between their diverging views and positions to the interaction between board  members,
they  made  sure  that  governance  structures  and  board  leadership  were  carefully  designed   to
balance the power and influence of each party.
As  customary  in  inductive  qualitative  research,  our  findings  partly  reflect  and  partly
extend  existing  knowledge  about  the  phenomenon  (Locke,  2001).  The   idea   that   members’
functional knowledge tends to affect their capacity to effectively perform  their  advisory  function
is not new (see Forbes and Milliken,  1999).  Indeed,  consistently  with  research  in  the  strategic
choice perspective (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Pettigrew and  McNulty,  1995),  we  observed
that the scope of  board  involvement  in  strategy  tends  to  be  affected  by  the  background  and
expertise of board members. Hillmann and Dalziel (2003), however, observe how research in  this
tradition has largely neglected the existence  of  incentives  for  board  members  to  engage  in  an
advisory role, and encourage scholars to be more sensitive to the  actual  capacity  and  motivation
of board members to contribute to firm performance. In this respect, our findings suggest  that  the
need to actively engage in strategy making – in order to advance or safeguard their own interests –
might  push  shareholders  to  appoint  knowledgeable  managers  who  could  actively  shape   the
content and even the context of strategies.  Although  we  have  only  anecdotal  evidence  of  such
intentionality  on  the  shareholders’  side,  it  does  not  seem  unreasonable  to  argue  that   while
heterogeneous interests may provide an incentive for shareholders’  representatives  in  expanding
the scope of their involvement in strategy, it is really the  possession  of  relevant  knowledge  that
allows board members to effectively engage in the initiation and elaboration of strategic proposals
(hence the dotted line in Figure I).
The board as a negotiation forum
Management scholars (Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles  and  Taylor,  2001;  Zahra  and  Pearce,  1989)
tend to agree that the most significant functions performed by the  board  in  the  strategy  making-
process are (i)  monitoring  managers’  behavior  in  order  to  protect  shareholders’  interests,  (ii)
reviewing and evaluating strategic decisions – or,  in  other  words,  advising  managers’  strategic
decisions – and  (iii)  facilitating  the  acquisition  of  resources  and  legitimacy  critical  to  firm’s
success (see Table VIII).
Evidence from our study, however, suggests  that  past  studies  might  have  overlooked  a
fourth important function of boards, namely facilitating the reconciliation of  diverging  goals  and
interests of represented shareholders. Doing research on large public companies, whose ownership
structure is assumed to be distributed among shareholders that share the same  objective  of  profit
maximization,  might  have  led  researchers  to  emphasize  the  struggle  between   the   opposing
interests of managers and shareholders, at the expense of a more sophisticated account of potential
differences among the interests represented in  the  board  (Lubatkin,  et  al.,  2001;  Young  et  al.
2002).
In fact, recent  studies  have  acknowledged  the  potential  divergence  of  interests  among
shareholders, and have started to investigate how it may affect corporate strategies  (Hoskisson,  et
al., 2002; Tihanyi, et al., 2003;  Yoshikawa  and  Phan,  2005).  In  financial  economics,  a  rising
stream of research addressing what has been termed the “principal-principal problem” is based  on
the recognition that in several European and Far Eastern countries – where the prototypical  public
company of the Anglo-Saxon world  is  not  the  prevalent  corporate  form  (La  Porta,  Lopez-De
Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) – large pyramidal business groups and  high  ownership  concentration
in listed companies  lead  to  a  potential  conflict  of  interests  between  controlling  and  minority
shareholders, the former being in the potential position to  expropriate  the  latter  of  part  of  their
value through unfair intragroup exchanges and transfers of goods (Faccio, Lang & Yeoung, 2001)
In this respect, our findings show how in presence of highly diverging interests among  the
shareholders,  boards  may  perform  a  critical   function   in   facilitating   the   reconcilement   of
conflicting views regarding strategic  issues  and  the  definition  of  a  common  set  of  goals  and
guidelines to direct managerial action. As David Hickson (1987) remarked, boards of directors are
a prime social mechanism to manage potentially conflicting interests. In  this  respect,  boards  are
not only a  monitoring  device  to  safeguard  shareholders’  interests  from  managers’  abuse,  but
provide the context within which convergence between partly diverging goals may be reached,  as
strategic plans are evaluated in terms of their technical rationality and financial viability as well as
of their impact on the goals and interests of all the represented parties.
Further research on boards as decision making teams, however, seems to  be  needed.  In  a
related  stream  of  research,  Donald  Hambrick  (1994,   1995)   has   advanced   the   concept   of
behavioral integration, understood as the  capacity  of  members  of  a  top  management  team  to
exchange  information  timely  and  effectively,  and  to  ensure  collaborative  behavior  and  joint
decision-making. TMTs and board of directors display  considerable  differences  as  regards  their
composition (the strategic apex of the company vs. a variable mix of insiders and outsiders),  their
leadership structure (usually concentrated in the hands of the CEO in TMTs, often distributed  and
influenced by board composition in boards of directors), and their average involvement in strategy
(a primary task for TMTs, an episodic activity for the average board). However, they can  be  both
conceptualized   as   small   decision-making   units   facing   ambiguous   tasks,   whose    relative
performance is influenced by  their  capacity  to  tap  individual  skills  and  knowledge  and  work
together towards a common goal (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hambrick, 1994).  Indeed,  in  some
of the cases we observed, some outside directors at time  acted  as  informal  members  of  the  top
management team. Future research may investigate  more  deeply  under  what  conditions  boards
may really operate as behaviorally integrated units.
Towards a contingency approach to board studies
More research on the  relationships  between  ownership  structure,  board  functions  and  strategy
making,  however,   seems   to   be   needed.   By   emphasizing   the   relationships   between   the
configuration of shareholders’ interests and the relative salience  of  the  political  function  of  the
board as a negotiation forum, our findings provide further support to the claim that under different
conditions, boards may perform different functions  and  their  level  of  involvement  in  strategy-
related activities may vary accordingly.
The idea that the prevailing functions  of  the  board  may  be  contingent  upon  contextual
factors has been recently advanced theoretically (Forbes and Milliken, 1999;  Lynall,  Golden  and
Hillman, 2003) and seems to have found increasing empirical support. Past research has  observed
how board involvement in strategy tends to increase  in  times  of  crisis  (Mace,  1971).  A  recent
study of the airline industry shows also how changing institutional pressures may lead  to  changes
in board composition and structure, in order to adapt  to  the  increased  salience  of  the  resource-
dependence  function  (Hillman  et  al.,  2000).  Conversely,  increased  market  competition   may
stimulate the adoption of more sophisticated practices for evaluating top managers, in response  to
a rising salience of the monitoring function (Young, et  al.  2000).  Finally,  research  focusing  on
specific types of firms, such as family firms (Danco and Jonovic, 1981; Ward  and  Handy,  1988)
or subsidiaries (Huse and Rindova, 2001; Leksell  and  Lindgren,  1982),  suggests  that  the  main
functions performed by the board may vary considerably across corporate forms.
Collectively, these studies point at the  role  of  contextual  or  environmental  variables  in
affecting the relative salience of the various functions performed by boards  of  directors.  In  turn,
changing salience of  board  functions  may  require  changes  in  the  way  a  board  is  composed,
structured and managed. If this is true, the application of universal guidelines and prescriptions for
board design and management, with little  regard  for  the  specificity  of  the  focal  firm,  may  be
questionable. In this respect, we believe  that  a  replication  of  our  study  across  other  corporate
forms and in other settings may further explore how environmental and contextual variables affect
the prevailing functions of the board and the appropriate degree of its involvement  in  strategy,  in
order to develop contingent prescriptions that take into  account  the  specificity  of  the  corporate
context. 
In this respect, it may be argued that what we observed might  have  been  affected  by  the
cultural and institutional context within which the observed processes occurred. However, there  is
little evidence that this was the case. In six companies out of nine at least one of  the  shareholders
was a foreign multinational company and several directors were not locals, which seem  to  reduce
the  likelihood  of  substantial  cultural  influence  on  the  observed  dynamics.  Furthermore,   the
theoretical rationale that seems to explain the observed relationships does not appear to be culture-
bound, but might apply equally well in other cultural contexts. This is not to  say  that  we  do  not
believe that peculiar culture and institutions may not affect  board  dynamics.  Indeed,  we  believe
that more comparative studies are needed in order to  test  the  robustness  of  research  findings  –
including ours – across national borders.
CONCLUSIONS
Our research  investigated  contextual  antecedents  of  board  involvement  in  strategy-making  in
mixed-ownership institutions. Evidence from our study indicate that in the  presence  of  diverging
interests  among  represented  shareholders,  board  of  directors  may  facilitate  the   construction,
preservation or restoration of consensus regarding the  strategic  course  of  the  company.  In  this
sense, the  board  of  directors  participates  in  the  political  dimension  of  the  strategic  decision
process  not  only  as  a  single  monolithic  entity  interacting  with  top  managers,  but  also  as  a
negotiation forum where an agreement between represented shareholders is to  be  reached  before
confronting the management. These findings  expand  traditional  understandings  of  the  strategic
functions of the board and provide further  support  to  the  idea  that  the  relative  salience  of  the
various functions may be contingent upon contextual factors.
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Table I. Description of the firms
|Firm           |Sales    |Employees  |Background information                                                                                               |
|               |(.000 €) |           |                                                                                                                     |
|Redaelli Tecna |150,000  |1,000      |Redaelli Tecna was a holding company controlling subsidiaries operating in the metallurgy industry (steel cables for |
|               |         |           |cableways, equipment for the production of steel cables, etc.). The equity of the company was distributed among four |
|               |         |           |top managers collectively owning 40% of the shares, an institutional investor (Fin2000) with 25% of the shares, and a|
|               |         |           |merchant bank (Sopaf) with 35%.                                                                                      |
|Teknecomp      |150,000  |800        |Teknecomp was a holding company whose mission was to acquire undervalued small and medium enterprises, to manage     |
|               |         |           |their growth and to sell them. The company was controlled by Quattroduedue, a financial holding owned by a coalition |
|               |         |           |of shareholders made by three top managers, a foreign institutional investor, and some Italian wealthy families. Our |
|               |         |           |informants did not want to disclose the exact distribution of shareholdings of the company, but confirmed that no    |
|               |         |           |shareholder owned more than 50%.                                                                                     |
|Tecnologistica |100,000  |3,200      |Tecnologistica was a company operating in the logistic industry with a strong focus on growth. The company was owned |
|               |         |           |by a coalition of shareholders made by some top managers with 3% of the shares, an institutional investor (Advent    |
|               |         |           |International) with 49% of the shares, a second institutional investor (Pechel Industries) with 24% of the shares, a |
|               |         |           |closed fund (Chase Gemina) with 8% of the shares, a second closed fund (Schroeder) with 8% of the shares, and an     |
|               |         |           |industrial company (Pirelli) with 8% of the shares.                                                                  |
|Polimeri Europa|1,150,000|1,600      |Polimeri Europa was a chemical company, leader in Europe in the production of polyethylene. The company was a 50-50  |
|               |         |           |joint venture between Enichem (the largest Italian chemical company owned by the State) and Union Carbide (a giant   |
|               |         |           |chemical US company). Both mother companies had supply relationship with the joint venture: Enichem was a supplier of|
|               |         |           |services and materials (monomers), Union Carbide was a supplier of know-how and technology (gas phase Unipol Pe).    |
|Nylstar        |300,000  |1,400      |Nylstar was a chemical company, leader in Europe in the production of nylon yarn for textiles. The company was a     |
|               |         |           |50-50 joint venture between Snia Fibre (the largest Italian producer of artificial fibers) and Rhone Poulenc (a large|
|               |         |           |French chemical company). Rhone Poulenc supplied also raw materials for nylon 6 and 6.6.                             |
|Olivetti Canon |250,000  |800        |Olivetti Canon Industriale was a company producing ink jet printers and photocopiers. The company was a 50-50 joint  |
|Industriale    |         |           |venture between Olivetti (the largest office automation company in Italy) and Canon. Olivetti was both a supplier of |
|               |         |           |technology (technical know-how) and a client. Canon was both a supplier of technology (new products) and a client.   |
|Italtel        |1,850,000|15,900     |Italtel was a telecommunication company producing equipment such as switching and radio-bridge. The company was a    |
|               |         |           |50-50 joint venture between Stet (the largest Italian telecommunication company owned by the State) and Siemens. Stet|
|               |         |           |(Telecom) was by far the main customer of the joint venture, Siemens was both a customer and a competitor on other   |
|               |         |           |European markets.                                                                                                    |
|Siemens-Nixdorf|300,000  |900        |Siemens Nixdorf Informatica was a large office automation company selling both products (personal computer, server,  |
|Informatica    |         |           |etc.) and services (design, maintenance, etc.). The company was a 50-50 joint venture between Siemens Nixdorf        |
|               |         |           |Information Systems A.G. and Stet (the largest Italian telecommunication company). Siemens Nixdorf was a supplier of |
|               |         |           |technology (know-how and products), Stet was a large client.                                                         |
|Telepiù        |200,000  |1,100      |Telepiù was the only broadcasting company selling pay-tv services in Italy. The company was a joint venture between  |
|               |         |           |Kirch’s group (a large company in the German broadcasting industry), with 45% of the shares; Nethold (a South African|
|               |         |           |company) with 45% of the shares; and Fininvest (the largest private broadcasting company in Italy) with 10%. Kirch’s |
|               |         |           |group was a supplier of content and know-how in the broadcasting industry, Nethold was a supplier of technology for  |
|               |         |           |satellite broadcasting and Fininvest was a supplier of services and also a competitor.                               |
Table II. Description of the observed decisions
|Firm        |Observed decision                                                                        |Informants and    |
|            |                                                                                         |interests they    |
|            |                                                                                         |represented       |
|Redaelli    |A large, long-term contract signed in the US suggested the establishment of an overseas  |CEO               |
|Tecna       |production facility. Top managers examined possible alternatives (i.e. to export from    |(shareholder-manag|
|            |European plants or to set up a plant in the US) and took them to the board. The board,   |er)               |
|            |after having evaluated the alternatives, decided to proceed with the overseas investment.|Director (inst.   |
|            |                                                                                         |investor)         |
|            |                                                                                         |Director (merchant|
|            |                                                                                         |bank)             |
|Teknecomp   |A large American corporation disclosed to a general manager of a subsidiary its interest |CEO               |
|            |in acquiring the company. Top managers of Teknecomp started the negotiation with the     |(shareholder-manag|
|            |American corporation and kept directors informed along the process. Before signing the   |er)               |
|            |contract, top managers took the decision to the board for its approval. The board        |Director (inst.   |
|            |approved the decision.                                                                   |investor)         |
|Tecnologisti|The rapid trend toward the concentration in the logistic industry suggested the need to  |CEO               |
|ca          |grow through acquisitions. Top managers found an interesting medium-sized and prepared a |(shareholder-manag|
|            |business plan illustrating the rationale, the timing and the financial implications of   |er)               |
|            |the operation. Top managers took the decision to the board for its approval and, after   |Director (inst.   |
|            |having obtained the authorization, signed the contract.                                  |investor)         |
|Polimeri    |Polimeri Europa was facing an increasing demand requiring an expansion in the production |CEO (Union        |
|Europa      |capacity. Top managers of the venture explored possible alternatives and decided to build|Carbide)          |
|            |a new production facility, the largest in Europe. Some directors – representing the two  |Chairman (Enichem)|
|            |mother companies – assisted senior managers in developing the final proposal. The board  |                  |
|            |collectively approved the proposal during a formal meeting.                              |                  |
|Nylstar     |In order to reduce production costs, managers proposed to move part of the production to |Chairman (SNIA)   |
|            |Eastern Europe. A director suggested the acquisition of a firm localized in Slovakia. The|CEO (Rhone        |
|            |board decided to create a committee – composed by senior managers of the venture and some|Poulenc)          |
|            |board members – aimed at collecting further information and preparing a proposal. The    |                  |
|            |committee took the different alternatives to the board, which decided to proceed with the|                  |
|            |investment.                                                                              |                  |
|Olivetti    |The company was facing increasing sales requiring an expansion in the production         |Chairman          |
|Canon       |capacity. During some informal meetings, some directors worked in close collaboration    |(Olivetti)        |
|Industriale |with managers from the venture to elaborate possible alternatives and to develop a       |Director (Canon)  |
|            |proposal. The proposal was taken to the board for formal approval after the two main     |                  |
|            |representatives of the shareholders – the chairman and an outside director – had reached |                  |
|            |an agreement.                                                                            |                  |
|Italtel     |During a board meeting, a director representing Siemens proposed to move production to   |Chairman (super   |
|            |one of the company’s plants. Directors representing Stet, however, objected to the       |partes)           |
|            |proposal and proposed instead to increase the production of the existing plant. No       |Director (Stet)   |
|            |decision was taken in the meeting. Some directors representing the two mother companies  |Director (Siemens)|
|            |were delegated the task to analyze the problem and to find a consensus on the decision.  |                  |
|Siemens-Nixd|Siemens Nixdorf, as part of its own expansion strategy, was planning to enter to the     |Chairman (super   |
|orf         |information service business in Italy, by acquiring the related activities of the        |partes)           |
|Informatica |venture. Some directors – representing the two shareholders – organized informal meetings|CEO (Siemens      |
|            |in order to analyze if and how to carry out the operation. They finally decided to create|Nixdorf)          |
|            |a new company and spin off all the assets related to the industry. After having reached a|                  |
|            |consensus, the directors working on the project took the decision to the board. The board|                  |
|            |approved the decision.                                                                   |                  |
|Telepiù     |A board member, appointed by Nethold, a potential supplier of technology, proposed the   |CEO (ex Fininvest)|
|            |upgrade of the technological platform for digital broadcasting. The board delegated the  |                  |
|            |formulation and the evaluation of the possible alternatives to the executive committee   |Director (Nethold)|
|            |and to some informal meetings among representatives of the shareholders. When            |                  |
|            |shareholders’ representatives found an agreement, the executive committee took the       |Director (Kirch)  |
|            |decision to the board. The board approved the decision                                   |                  |
Table III. Taking strategic decisions in Type A boards: Some illustrative evidence
|                       |Redaelli Tecna                |Teknecomp                     |Tecnologistica                |
|Narrow involvement.    |It is usually a “one man      |Business plans are elaborated |We [the top managers] quickly |
|Boards essentially     |show”: [the CEO] presents the |by the management […] When    |discussed the proposal, based |
|engage in the selection|board with some plans and     |plans are developed in        |on some preliminary           |
|of alternatives and in |illustrates them in detail (…)|details, we [the managers]    |information. Then we informed |
|the control of the     |We analyze them, discuss them |take the proposals to the     |the board. (…) Later, we      |
|realization            |and eventually say yes or no  |board for its approval (CEO). |submitted some sort of        |
|                       |(…) (director).               |                              |business plan along with a    |
|                       |                              |                              |draft of the contract (CEO).  |
|Prevailing activity:   |The board of directors meets  |The board meets only 4-5 times|When we find a target company |
|Gatekeeping. – i.e.    |rarely, basically to approve  |per year to approve           |that we believe suits the     |
|approving capital      |the balance sheet and to take |acquisitions or sales of      |growth strategy of the        |
|investments            |major decisions. […] The CEO  |subsidiaries exceeding the    |company, we develop a detailed|
|                       |prepares strategic and        |amount of 5 million euros, and|business plan and submit it to|
|                       |financial plans and submit    |to monitor the performance of |the board. (…) If the board   |
|                       |them to the board (director). |the subsidiaries and the      |authorizes it, we carry out   |
|                       |                              |holding company (director).   |the acquisition (CEO).        |
|Prevailing decision    |Recently, we signed a five    |All decisions are usually     |We usually approve or reject  |
|mechanism: Analysis.   |year contract for a large     |taken collectively after we   |proposals based on their      |
|Managers’ proposals are|supply in the USA. The size of|have circulated all the       |financial profile. We look at |
|discussed during board |the contract brought us to    |relevant information before   |ratios like the net present   |
|meetings and evaluated |consider the establishment of |and at the meeting. You see,  |value or the internal rate of |
|on financial grounds   |an overseas production        |we all generally agree that   |return (director).            |
|                       |facility in order to reduce   |proposals should be evaluated |                              |
|                       |the transportation costs. (…) |on purely financial grounds   |                              |
|                       |I was delegated to explore    |(CEO).                        |                              |
|                       |possible alternatives and to  |                              |                              |
|                       |take them to the board for the|                              |                              |
|                       |approval. (…) We discussed    |                              |                              |
|                       |about commercial and          |                              |                              |
|                       |industrial issues, but        |                              |                              |
|                       |eventually they decided based |                              |                              |
|                       |on the discounted cash flow   |                              |                              |
|                       |(CEO).                        |                              |                              |
Table IV. Shaping strategic decisions in Type B boards: Some illustrative evidence
|                               |Polimeri Europa                          |Nylstar                                  |
|Broad  involvement. Board      |Strategic proposals are usually initiated|In order to increase our understanding of|
|members assist managers in the |by senior managers, but later some board |the pros and cons of the operation, we   |
|development of alternatives and|members can enter into the process in    |decided to create a committee that would |
|in the implementation of plans |order to help managers to elaborate the  |include the general manager and two      |
|                               |details of the plan before its formal    |outside directors, a sales manager and an|
|                               |approval (chairman).                     |operations manager in the mother         |
|                               |                                         |companies (…) The committee worked for   |
|                               |                                         |about two months collecting information, |
|                               |                                         |visiting the site, exploring             |
|                               |                                         |alternatives, etc. (…) Eventually, after |
|                               |                                         |having analyzed all the possible costs   |
|                               |                                         |and benefits implicit in each            |
|                               |                                         |alternative, we presented two different  |
|                               |                                         |proposals to the board, implying         |
|                               |                                         |different combinations of risk and return|
|                               |                                         |(CEO).                                   |
|                               |                                         |                                         |
|Prevailing activity:           |The board meets 6-7 times per year, once |The board meets four times per year.     |
|Gatekeeping – i.e. approving   |to approve the balance sheet and the     |Three meetings are dedicated to review   |
|capital investments            |other ones when we [the top management]  |the financial performance of the company,|
|                               |submit investment proposals for the      |to prepare the budget, to organize the   |
|                               |approval (…) Their evaluation is usually |presentation of financial results to the |
|                               |straightforward and tends to focus on the|shareholders, or to approve large        |
|                               |expected impact on the financial results |investments. Then a fourth meeting is    |
|                               |(CEO).                                   |usually dedicated to evaluate top        |
|                               |                                         |managers and to choose or nominee new    |
|                               |                                         |managers (chairman).                     |
|Prevailing decision mechanism: |[Board members’] evaluation tends to     |[…] the final decision is usually taken  |
|Analysis. Proposals developed  |focus on the expected impact on the      |considering essentially the impact of the|
|by managers in collaboration   |financial results. The main objective we |project on the return for the            |
|with individual board members  |have is to make money (CEO).             |shareholders (chairman).                 |
|are brought to the attention of|                                         |                                         |
|the board and evaluated on     |                                         |                                         |
|financial grounds              |                                         |                                         |
Table V. Shaping the context and content of strategic decisions in Type C boards: Some
illustrative evidence
|                  |Siemens Nixdorf           |Olivetti Canon Industriale|Italtel                   |Telepiù                |
|                  |Informatica               |                          |                          |                       |
|Broad involvement.|It is normal for [board   |The available alternatives|Eventually, the board     |At times, some         |
|Board members     |members] to contribute to |were evaluated with the   |delegated some members to |directors may be       |
|often initiate the|the elaboration of        |assistance of directors   |elaborate a proposal. Some|involved in dealing    |
|process and assist|strategies: some members  |(…) [After the approval of|high officers of the      |with specific issues.  |
|managers in the   |even tend to follow       |the board] managers took  |company would assist them.|[…] It depends on their|
|analysis and      |strategic issues more     |care of the details, but  |(…) In the next meeting   |background: for        |
|development of    |closely, outside board    |the same board members    |the board ratified the    |example, I was called  |
|alternatives and  |meetings (chairman).      |collaborated to implement |decision (chairman).      |in because of my       |
|in the            |                          |the strategies (director).|                          |knowledge of           |
|implementation of |                          |                          |                          |regulations and        |
|plans             |                          |                          |                          |institutions           |
|                  |                          |                          |                          |(director).            |
|Prevailing        |Analyzing and elaborating |We would meet periodically|During meetings, we spend |The board discusses    |
|activity: Setting |strategic plans is a      |to discuss about what     |time refining and         |broad topics: marketing|
|the strategic     |primary task of the board.|products to develop, how  |evaluating the budget and |policies, technological|
|context – i.e.    |(CEO).                    |to expand in other        |the strategic plans, but  |developments, as well  |
|defining goals and|                          |European markets, and the |also analyzing and        |as issues of capital   |
|general policies  |                          |like (chairman).          |discussing in details     |structure (CEO).       |
|                  |                          |                          |projects aimed at reducing|                       |
|                  |                          |                          |costs or at developing the|                       |
|                  |                          |                          |business (chairman).      |                       |
|Prevailing        |Usually (…) the final     |Strategic decisions       |The equilibrium inside the|When issues touch      |
|decision          |decision is taken outside |emerged from direct       |board reduces the risk    |specific interests of  |
|mechanism:        |regular meetings and only |relationships between     |that one shareholder takes|the shareholders, the  |
|Bargaining. Board |when an agreement is      |shareholders (…)          |advantage of the other    |executive committee    |
|members frequently|reached between the       |Shareholders had          |one. If either sponsors a |presents the board with|
|engage in         |shareholders (chairman).  |identified two main       |decision that favors its  |a decision that has    |
|negotiations, in  |                          |representatives (…) When  |interests at the expense  |been taken elsewhere.  |
|order to reach a  |Having senior managers    |we had found an agreement |of the other, the latter  |They involve the rest  |
|consensus before  |from both partners sitting|we informed the other     |has the power to react    |of the directors only  |
|bringing the      |in the board is crucial:  |board members (chairman). |(chairman).               |after they had found a |
|decision to the   |they have power to        |                          |                          |settlement (director). |
|board meeting     |negotiate on behalf of    |                          |                          |                       |
|                  |mother companies, and when|                          |                          |                       |
|                  |they reach an agreement   |                          |                          |                       |
|                  |that is it (CEO).         |                          |                          |                       |
Table VI. Board composition and the role of directors: Type A boards
|Company    |Board Size |Board composition                                                                              |
|Redaelli   |10         |1 insider (the CEO, also a shareholder)                                                        |
|Tecna      |           |9 decision controllers (a relative of the CEO, two chartered accountants representing the CEO; |
|           |           |three executives of the merchant bank, among which the Chairman; two academicians and a legal  |
|           |           |advisor representing the institutional investor)                                               |
|           |           |Executives from the merchant bank occasionally acted as support specialists on financial       |
|           |           |operations and acquisitions                                                                    |
|Teknecomp  |7          |2 insiders (the CEO and the general manager, both owning shares in the company)                |
|           |           |5 decision controllers (an executive of an institutional investor, acting as Chairman, a lawyer|
|           |           |representing the private families, an executive of a bank, two executives in other companies,  |
|           |           |who may also be considered business experts)                                                   |
|Tecnologist|8          |3 insiders (the CEO, acting also as Chairman, and two managers, all owning shares in the       |
|ica        |           |company)                                                                                       |
|           |           |5 decision controllers (four executives from two institutional investors, one lawyer           |
|           |           |representing the interests of three minority shareholders)                                     |
Table VII. Board composition and the role of directors: Type B and C boards
|Company |Board   |Board composition                                                                                  |
|        |Size    |                                                                                                   |
|Polimeri|8       |2 insiders (CEO, appointed by Union Carbide, and general manager, appointed by Enichem)            |
|Europa  |        |3 decision controllers / business experts appointed by Enichem, among whom the Chairman (two high  |
|        |        |officers and one functional manager of the mother company)                                         |
|        |        |3 decision controllers / business experts appointed by Union Carbide (two high officers and one    |
|        |        |country manager of the mother company)                                                             |
|Nylstar |8       |1 insider (Chairman of the joint venture, appointed by SNIA Fibre)                                 |
|        |        |1 insider (CEO appointed by Rhone Poulenc)                                                         |
|        |        |2 decision controllers / business experts from Rhone Poulenc (the CEO and a sales manager of the   |
|        |        |mother company)                                                                                    |
|        |        |2 decision controllers / business experts from SNIA Fibre (the CEO and an operations manager of the|
|        |        |mother company)                                                                                    |
|        |        |2 decision controllers (merchant bankers representing respectively SNIA Fibre and Rhone Poulenc)   |
|Olivetti|8       |1 insider (CEO of the joint venture, appointed by Olivetti)                                        |
|Canon   |        |1 decision controller (financial manager, appointed by Olivetti)                                   |
|Industri|        |2 decision controllers / business experts from Olivetti (one acting as Chairman)                   |
|ale     |        |4 decision controllers / business experts from Canon (functional managers in the mother company)   |
|Italtel |9       |1 insider (an ex-executive of both mother companies, acting as Chairman, considered super partes by|
|        |        |both  shareholders)                                                                                |
|        |        |4 decision controllers from Siemens (two of them, functional managers in technology and operations |
|        |        |at Siemens, can be considered business experts)                                                    |
|        |        |4 decision controllers  from STET (two of them, functional managers in technology and operations at|
|        |        |STET, can be considered business experts)                                                          |
|Siemens-|7       |1 insider (an ex-executive of both mother companies, acting as Chairman, considered super partes by|
|Nixdorf |        |both shareholders)                                                                                 |
|Informat|        |1 insider (general manager, appointed by STET)                                                     |
|ica     |        |2 decision controllers appointed by STET (one of them, the CEO of STET, can be considered a        |
|        |        |business expert)                                                                                   |
|        |        |3 decision controllers appointed by Siemens Nixdorf (one of them, a local country manager of       |
|        |        |Siemens Nixdorf, can be considered a business expert)                                              |
|Telepiù |9       |1 insider (co-CEO, initially appointed by Fininvest, later confirmed by Nethold)                   |
|        |        |1 insider (co-CEO appointed by Nethold)                                                            |
|        |        |1 business expert (a high officer in the Kirch Group, acting as chairman)                          |
|        |        |1 business expert appointed by Nethold (an ex-executive and board member in other high-tech        |
|        |        |companies)                                                                                         |
|        |        |1 decision controller appointed by Nethold (a lawyer)                                              |
|        |        |3 decision controllers from the Kirch Group (two of them, a sales manager and a technology manager |
|        |        |can be considered business experts)                                                                |
|        |        |1 decision controller / business expert appointed by Fininvest (a high officer in the mother       |
|        |        |company)                                                                                           |
Table VIII. Board involvement in strategy: past research and insights from our study
|                  |Agency                  |Strategic Choice        |Resource Dependence     |Political               |
|Central issue     |Divergence of interests |Adaptation to           |Acquisition of critical |Reconcilement of        |
|                  |between managers and    |environmental changes;  |resources; the board is |multiple interests      |
|                  |shareholders; the board |the board is a potential|an important mechanism  |converging on the firm  |
|                  |is a primary mechanism  |source of contributions |for “managing” the      |and represented in the  |
|                  |for safeguarding        |to the development,     |environment and securing|board; the board is a   |
|                  |shareholders’ interests |analysis and selection  |institutional support   |primary mechanism for   |
|                  |(Fama and Jensen, 1983) |of alternative courses  |(Pfeffer and Salancik,  |social integration      |
|                  |                        |of action (Andrews,     |1978)                   |(Hickson, 1987)         |
|                  |                        |1980)                   |                        |                        |
|Contribution of   |Support for             |Imported knowledge about|Connection with critical|Representation and      |
|outside directors |risk-seeking,           |managerial practices,   |resource-holders and    |safeguard of outside    |
|                  |profit-oriented         |business, etc.          |institutional actors    |interests converging on |
|                  |strategies              |                        |                        |the firm                |
|Contribution of   |Support for risk-averse,|Firm specific knowledge |Cooptation of           |Mediation between the   |
|inside directors  |conservative strategies |                        |influential members of  |interests of the firms  |
|                  |                        |                        |the community           |and those of the        |
|                  |                        |                        |                        |represented parties     |
|Primary strategic |Monitoring. Ensure that |Advice. Contribute to   |Environmental linkage.  |Consensus building.     |
|function of the   |the content of corporate|the rational solution of|Secure the resources and|Facilitate the          |
|board             |strategies is aligned   |strategic problems      |legitimacy required to  |compromise between      |
|                  |with shareholders’      |                        |implement strategies    |diverging interests     |
|                  |interests               |                        |                        |about the outcome of    |
|                  |                        |                        |                        |strategic decisions     |
|Primary           |Board power relative to |Board members’          |Institutional pressures |Heterogeneity of        |
|antecedents of    |the CEO, as affected    |possession of relevant  |(Hillmann, Cannella and |represented interests   |
|board involvement |mainly by board         |knowledge (Tashakori and|Paetzold, 2000)         |                        |
|                  |composition (Baysinger  |Boulton, 1983; Carpenter|                        |Existence of conflict   |
|                  |et al., 1991) and CEO   |and Westphal, 2001)     |                        |regulation mechanisms   |
|                  |duality (Mallette and   |                        |                        |                        |
|                  |Fowler, 1992; Zajac and |                        |                        |                        |
|                  |Westphal, 1996)         |                        |                        |                        |
Figure 1: Heterogeneous interests and board involvement in strategy: an emerging explanatory
framework
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